The syntactic approach to epistemic logic avoids the logical omniscience problem by taking knowledge as primary rather than as defined in terms of possible worlds. In this study, we combine the syntactic approach with modal logic, using transition systems to model reasoning. We use two syntactic epistemic modalities: 'knowing at least' a set of formulae and 'knowing at most' a set of formulae. We are particularly interested in models restricting the set of formulae known by an agent at a point in time to be finite. The resulting systems are investigated from the point of view of axiomatization and complexity. We show how these logics can be used to formalise non-omniscient agents who know some inference rules, and study their relationship to other systems of syntactic epistemic logics, such as Å gotnes and
Introduction
The most studied formal logics of knowledge and belief, epistemic and doxastic logics 1 [16, 25] , explain knowledge and belief in terms of a possible worlds semantics [21] . An alternative approach is to take knowledge or belief as primary. The most straightforward way of doing this is to replace the standard Kripke structures describing the possible worlds with functions assigning truth values to formulae of the form B, meaning that is believed, directly. We call this approach the syntactic approach, since the truth value of two epistemic formulae can differ if the formulae differ syntactically. The syntactic approach allows modelling more general assumptions about knowledge and belief, for example the lack of closure conditions or the possibility of believing two mutually inconsistent formulae at the same time. Indeed, most work using the syntactic approach have been motivated by the logical omniscience problem (LOP) [22] ; that epistemic logic based on possible worlds semantics describes knowledge which is closed under logical consequence. This is a problem if we want to model the explicitly computed knowledge of resource bounded reasoners, for example an agent who chooses which action to perform next based on the formulae it has deduced. Development of epistemic logics which do not suffer from the problem of logical omniscience is perceived to be an important challenge in formal specification and verification of agent systems [32] . See e.g. [16, 27, 31] for surveys of proposed solutions to the LOP. 1 In this article we do not distinguish between knowledge and belief, and will use both terms for the same concept. In particular, we do not assume that something which is known must be true.
to the standard epistemic language; the intuitive meaning of a formula such as hF i i is that will be true after some train of thought of agent i. The described logic can be seen as a dynamic version of the epistemic logic S4 n -however, no semantics is given for the logic. Yet another dynamic approach is Dynamic Syntactic Epistemic Logic (DSEL) [3] , a logic describing how finite syntactic epistemic states can evolve in a branching-time future, and how coalitions of agents can cooperate strategically to reach certain epistemic states. DSEL is based on ATL.
Our combination of standard syntactic models and simple transition systems yields an abstract, general and powerful formalism. Indeed, we show that our framework can be used to capture several aspects of reasoning and other knowledge dynamics modelled by the approaches mentioned earlier. For example, our framework gives a semantics for which Duc's DEL is sound and complete.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the language of modal syntactic epistemic logic and corresponding transition structures. We briefly consider the logic without the 5 operator, and show that it is axiomatizable by only the axioms of the modal system K. We consider the properties of accessibility relation which we may find useful to model time, for example seriality and determinism, and show that adding the corresponding modal axioms causes the logic to be complete with respect to the expected kind of structures. Then we introduce the 'at most' operator 5, show that it is not definable using 'at least', and provide a complete and sound axiomatization for arbitrary transition systems and for transition systems satisfying various restrictions on the accessibility relation, such as seriality, functionality, and transitivity. We show that the complexity of the model-checking problem and satisfiability-checking problem for the basic modal logic K with 5 is the same as for K. In Section 4, we introduce a new kind of condition on accessibility relation, corresponding to the agents knowing some inference rules and/or being able to communicate with each other. We prove several completeness results for logics with rules. In Section 5, we present some applications and examples, showing that we can capture important aspects of the dynamics of syntactic knowledge in TRL, DEL and DSEL, in our framework (including soundness and completeness of DEL). Finally, we discuss some other related work and conclude.
Syntactic knowledge
We assume that an agent can have different internal states at different times, and that in each state we can identify a finite set of formulae the agent believes-for example, the formulae stored in its knowledge base. Apart from finiteness, no restrictions, such as consistency or closure under consequence, on this set are assumed. Furthermore, we assume that the agent can act in order to change its current state, that it may have several alternative ways to act available, and that the available actions are a function of the current state. Such a transition system between states with syntactically ascribed beliefs can be seen as a general model of reasoning, including non-monotonic reasoning, belief revision, etc. In later sections we generalize this model to the multiagent case, where agents cannot only reason to change their own beliefs but also communicate to change other agents' beliefs.
Formally, we assume that the agent represents its beliefs in an arbitrary object language OL. Let Â(OL)¼{B : 2 OL} (or just Â when OL is clear from context) be the set of epistemic atoms. A model is a relational structure with a valuation of the epistemic atoms in each state, with the restriction that only finitely many epistemic atoms can be true in each state. Thus, a model will be used to interpret an epistemic atom B as a primitive proposition, and not as a formula with a modal operator. We write }(X) for the powerset of a set X, and } fin (X) for the set of all finite subsets of X.
DEFINITION 1
A model is a tuple M ¼ (W, R, V), where W is a non-empty set of states, R a binary relation over W, and V a function V : W!}(Â). The class of all models is denoted MðOLÞ (or just M).
The relation R is used to model acts of reasoning taking the agent from a state where it knows some finite set of formulae to another state where it knows some other such set. Note that we do not model time explicitly; intuitively, no transitions happen unless the agent chooses to perform a reasoning action.
A general model is a model without the finiteness condition:
where W is a non-empty set of states, R a binary relation over W, and V a function V : W !}(Â). The class of all general models is denoted M gen ðOLÞ (or just M gen ).
We are not interested in general models as such, but they are often useful as an intermediate stage in constructing a proper model.
Often, it is convenient to be able to refer to the set of object language formulae an agent believes in a given state. We write VðwÞ for the set {: B 2V(w)}, and call VðwÞ the agent's epistemic state in state w.
Knowing at least
M can be used to interpret the language of propositional modal logic, with epistemic atoms as primitive propositions, in the usual way.
The language LðOLÞ (or just L) is the least language such that:
Â(OL) are formulae If , are formulae, then ^ is a formula If is a formula, then : is a formula If is a formula, then s is a formula
For the sake of brevity, we do not introduce non-epistemic primitive propositions, however, their introduction would not require any non-trivial changes to the subsequent results.
The intended meaning of a formula of the form s is that the agent can choose some reasoning act such that becomes true in the next state.
We use the usual derived propositional connectives, in addition to oe for :s:. The intended meaning of a formula of the form oe is thus that will be true after any reasoning act performed by the agent. B means that the agent knows at least -he knows and may or may not know something else. When X is a finite set of object formulae, we write iX-read 'the agent knows at least X'-as a shorthand:
If X is a singleton set, we often omit brackets and use the equivalent notations Á, Á{} and B interchangeably.
The interpretation of L in general models is defined as usual in modal logic. When M ¼ (W, R, V) and w2W: 4fp; p ! qg !^4q: the agent can reason with modus ponens from p, p!q ^4q ! 4fp; p ! qg: the agent can only infer q by using modus ponens from the premises p and p!q 4p !^:4p: the agent may forget p in the next state 4p !^4p: the agent may remember p in the next state 4p ! oe4p: the agent must remember p in the next state
The class of models M is completely axiomatized by the modal logic K (in the language L). The logical system K consists of the axiom schemes (Prop) , when is a substitution instance of a propositional tautology (K) oe ð ! Þ ! ðoe ! oe Þ and the rules (Modus Ponens) From ; ! prove (Gen) From , prove oe In completeness proofs, we will often need to transform one (general) model into another while preserving satisfaction of certain formulae. We describe here two such transformations. First, we review the well-known concept of bisimulation, and, second, we describe a new and more general type of transformation which we call AE-bisimulation.
A brief review of the concept of a bisimulation (see, e.g. [8] for further details): It is easy to see that when AE ¼ Â, AE-bisimulation and bisimulation coincide. For a L formula , let Subf ðÞ be the set of subformulae of , where subformulae of the form B are treated as atomic subformulae (not parsed further). Let At() be the set of epistemic atoms occurring in , namely B 2 At() if B 2 Subf ðÞ.
The following theorem shows that AE-bisimulation preserves satisfaction of formulae with epistemic atoms in AE.
When AE Â, let LðAEÞ denote the subset of L containing formulae with At() AE.
THEOREM 1
Let w be a state in a (general) model M, and w 0 a state in a (general) model M 0 .
. If we assume that w ! AE w 0 , we can prove that the equivalence holds for any 2 LðAEÞ by structural induction. For the base case, 2 Â and 2 AE. M; w iff 2 V(w) iff 2 V(w) \ AE iff, by (1) 
The inductive step can be shown in exactly the same way as for standard bisimulation. g Theorem 1 formally shows the intuitive property that satisfaction of a formula does not depend on the valuation of atoms not mentioned in the formula. We say that a logic is weakly complete with respect to a class of models, if all formulae valid in the class are provable. A logic is strongly complete if for any set of formulae À, any logical consequence of À, i.e. any formula valid in the class consisting of all the models of À, is provable from À.
THEOREM 2
K is sound and weakly complete with respect to M. 
PROOF. It suffices to show that any
K-consistent formula is satisfied in M. Let M K ¼ ðW K ; R K ; V K Þ be
Useful axioms
In this section, we consider imposing additional conditions on the accessibility relation in the models.
Unbounded reasoning
Many syntactic approaches to epistemic logic [3, 6, 12] are based on the view that reasoning does not have an end point, but goes on indefinitely. This explains logical nonomniscience without sacrificing rationality: an agent can eventually get to know any particular fact it is able to compute, but can never get to know all of them at the same time.
In the models M, the assumption that an agent should be able to do any reasoning at all in a given state of the system is not made. In this section, we restrict the logic by adding this assumption.
Semantically, it corresponds to requiring that the accessibility relation is serial. A serial model is a model (W, R, V) where the accessibility relation is serial, i.e. where for each world w 2 W there exists a u 2 W such that Rwu. The class of all serial models is denoted M s . Proof-theoretically, the assumption of unbounded reasoning corresponds to adding the axiom schema (D)oe !^ The modal system KD is K extended with the D axiom.
THEOREM 3
KD is sound and complete with respect to M s .
PROOF. Like the proof of Theorem 2, with the canonical model for KD. g
Deterministic reasoning
The models in M are models of nondeterministic reasoning, in the sense that an agent may have several possible transitions from one state. In this section we explore the special case when reasoning is deterministic, i.e. when there is at most (or exactly, in the case of unbounded reasoning) one possible next state for each state. Formally, a deterministic model is one in which the accessibility relation is a (partial) function. The set of all deterministic models is 
Knowing at most
In the previous section, we presented different axiomatizations of 'knowing at least' a finite set of formulae in basic modal logic. The i operator was defined by the B operator. In this section, we add a dual operator 5 from [4] to the language. The intended meaning of 5X is 'the agent knows at most the finite set X'. The language L 5 ðOLÞ (or just L 5 ) is the language LðOLÞ with the following additional clause in its definition: 5X is a formula for every finite set X 2 } fin ðOLÞ of object formulae. We use the same derived connectives as in LðOLÞ, in addition to D X for 4X^5X. The intended meaning of DX is ''the agent knows exactly the finite set X''. An example of an L 
THEOREM 6
The operator 5 is not definable in LðOLÞ when the object language is infinite.
PROOF. Let X be a finite set of object language formulae. We show that for any L formula , there is a model M 0 and a state w such that M 0 ; w 6 $ 5X. Let be an L formula, and let M; w where M ¼ ðW; R; VÞ (if is unsatisfiable we are done, since every formula 5X is satisfiable). Let Y be the set of atoms occurring in . The proof above essentially uses the fact that L 5 ðOLÞ formulae are not preserved under AE-bisimulation, or that their truth value depends on assignment to atoms which do not occur in the formula. Most logics satisfy the principle of locality: the truth value of a formula does not depend on the assignment to variables other than the formula's free variables. This is such an obvious property that it usually goes unremarked; however some logics do violate it. This phenomenon was investigated for predicate logics in e.g. [28] ; for propositional logics, the only example we know of in addition to the logic of 5, is a related logic of operators 'knowing at least n formulae' [2] and the logic of only knowing [24] .
Although formulae of L 5 ðOLÞ are not preserved under AE-bisimulation, they are preserved under an operation which we call epistemic filtration through AE.
Recall the definition of At() for 2 LðOLÞ. We extend it to 2 L 5 ðOLÞ as follows. For an L 5 ðOLÞ formula , let Subf ðÞ be the set of subformulae of , where subformulae of the form B and 5X are treated as atomic formulae. B 2 AtðÞ if either B 2 Subf ðÞ, or for some X such that 2X, 5X 2 Subf ðÞ. As before, we refer to the sublanguage of L 5 ðÂÞ which only refers to atoms from AE as L 5 ðAEÞ. In particular, 5f 1 ;
THEOREM 7 L 5 ðAEÞ-formulae are preserved under epistemic filtration through AE.
PROOF. Let 2 L 5 ðAEÞ and let M ¼ (W,R,V) be a (general) model. We argue by induction on the complexity of that for every w 2W, M; w iff M 0 ; w , where M 0 is a result of filtrating M through AE.
Clearly, for B 2 AE, B 2V(w) iff B 2 V 0 (w). The cases for booleans and s are trivial. The only interesting case is the case of 5. We are going to show that for every set of epistemic atoms X AE the following condition holds:
VðwÞ X iff V 0 ðwÞ X From this it would immediately follow that if fB : 2 Xg AE, then M; w 5X iff M 0 ; w 5X.
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First, consider the case when V(w) AE. Then V 0 (w) ¼ V(w) and the condition above holds trivially, for any set of epistemic atoms X. In the other case, V(w) contains at least one atom B 6 2 AE. Then V 0 ðwÞ ¼ ðVðwÞ \ AEÞ [ fBg for some fresh B 6 2 AE. For X AE, the condition V(w) X iff V 0 (w) X holds trivially, since if V(w) contains a non-AE atom, V(w) X is false, and so is V 0 (w) X (because V 0 (w) contains B which is not in AE and hence not in X). g
COROLLARY 1
Every L 5 ðOLÞ formula which has a general model, has a model.
We now present axiomatizations of logics with the 5 operator. The axiomatizations extend the axiomatization of the purely epistemic fragment (i.e. without the modal logic) in [4] .
Axiomatization
The properties of 5 are captured by the following axiom schemata [4] :
E1 says essentially that iX^5Y (believing all formulae in X and at most the formulae in Y) implies X Y. Note that X Y is not a formula in the logic, so instead we formulate the axiom schema which declares all instances of iX^5Y with X 6 Y inconsistent. E2 allows us to narrow down the set of beliefs: if we know that the agent believes at most f 1 ; . . . ; n g and does not believe n , then we can conclude that it believes at most f 1 ; . . . ; nÀ1 g. Finally, E3 simply states that 5 is monotone.
We write K5 for K extended with E1-E3, and similarly for other systems and axioms. A logical system is defined relative to a logical language, and whenever 5 is involved we implicitly take the language to be L 5 ðOLÞ. Before proving weak completeness for K5 with respect to M, we are going to show an auxiliary result: that every K5-consistent formula is satisfied in a general model (that is, a model with possibly infinite epistemic states). Then we will use the fact that each general model for a formula can be transformed into a model for by epistemic filtration. PROOF. Let 5X 0 2 w. For the direction to the right, let 5X 2 w and let 2 Bel w . If it were the case that 6 2 X, then, since B 2 w, : 5 X 2 w by E1 which contradicts the consistency of w. Thus, 2 X. For the direction to the left, let Bel w X. If X 0 X, then 5X 2 w by E3 and we are done, so assume that X 0 6 X. Let 1 ; . . . ; k be the formulae in X 0 but not in X, i.e.
,X are finite). Since Bel w X and i 6 2 X, i 6 2 Bel w for any i2 [1,k] . Thus, for each i, B i 6 2 w, and by maximality :B i 2 w. By (k applications of) E2, 5ðX 0 n f 1 ; . . . ; k gÞ 2 w, and since X 0 n f 1 ; . . . ; k g X, 5X 2 w by E3. g
The Lindenbaum lemma which states that we can extend every K5-consistent set to a K5-consistent and L 5 ðOLÞ-maximal set, holds by the usual proof and will be used without explicit reference.
The existence lemma also has a standard proof: PROOF. This follows immediately from Theorem 7: we take an epistemic filtration of M through At(), choosing some fresh formula 2 OL to obtain an epistemic atom B 6 2 AtðÞ to replace all non-At() atoms in V f , includingp. g THEOREM 10 K5 is sound and weakly complete with respect to M.
PROOF. Soundness follows from the easily seen fact that E1-E3 are valid-in addition to validity of K and the fact that MP and Gen preserve validity.
Completeness follows from Theorem 8 and Theorem 9. g Before we proceed to investigate the complexity of K5, it is useful to state explicitly some obvious facts concerning the logic. The proof of this fact is totally standard.
The modal degree of a K5 formula is the (greatest) depth of nesting of modal operatorsî n the formula.
FACT 2 Formulae of K5 of modal degree less or equal to n are preserved under n-bisimulation.
The notion of n-bisimulation is defined for example in [8] ; intuitively, it means that the similarity between models can be maintained not indefinitely, as in the case of bisimulation, but for at least n steps.
Also, by the standard modal filtration argument, FACT 3 Each satisfiable formula of K5 is satisfiable in a finite model.
From the facts above, it follows that FACT 4
Each satisfiable formula of K5 of modal degree less or equal to n has a finite tree model of depth n.
Given a finite model M and a state w satisfying a formula of modal degree n, we can unravel M into a tree model with the root w, and cut it off at depth n. In the resulting model M', the root is n-bisimilar to w in M, hence satisfies the same formulae of depth less or equal to n.
Complexity of K5
The model-checking complexity of K5 is the same as the model-checking complexity of K. Checking whether a subformula of the form 5X is true in an epistemic state s can be done in time linear in the size of X, provided that it is possible to check in constant time whether a formula is in the epistemic state or not, and provided we keep a record of the size of each epistemic state. To verify whether 5X is true, given an epistemic state s, set up a counter initially equal to the size of s, and check for every formula in X whether it is in s, and if it is, decrement the counter. If we have checked all formulae in X and the counter is equal to 0, then the formula 5X is true, else it is false (there are formulae in s which are not in X).
To see that the satisfiability problem for K5 is PSPACE-complete, observe first that it is PSPACE-hard since K5 includes K; on the other hand, K5 has models of polynomial depth, and the usual NPSPACE algorithm can be used to guess branches of the model, which can be written using polynomial space. Since NPSPACE¼PSPACE, the satisfiability problem for K5 is in PSPACE.
Additional axioms
We take assumptions about unbounded and deterministic reasoning into account-now for the language L 5 . It is straightforward to show that adding the standard modal axioms such as F, D and 4 to K5 produces logics which are sound and weakly complete with respect to the corresponding classes of models.
THEOREM 11
KF5 is sound and weakly complete with respect to M d .
PROOF. Soundness follows from the fact that the F axiom is valid in M d . For completeness, consider a KF5-consistent formula . By Theorem 8, it is satisfied in a general canonical model. By the standard modal argument, the presence of the F axiom allows to transform this model into a deterministic model (F forces all accessible worlds to satisfy the same formulae, and identical worlds can be glued together, yielding a bisimilar model 
Different from the single agent case is that a state w no longer corresponds to the state of a single agent, but to a global state of a system consisting of several agents, each with its own epistemic state. Intuitively, the fact that ðw; w 0 Þ 2 R i means that agent i can change the system from state w to state w 0 . Thus, agent i can potentially affect the epistemic states of other agents in addition to his own. In Section 4 we use this fact to model both reasoning and communication in a multiagent system. Note that the transitions available to agent i depend the state of the whole system.
The logical language for the case of n agents, denoted L 5 n , is defined from Â n in the same way L 5 is defined from Â, with the operators^and 5 replaced by indexed operators^i and 5 i for each agent i (1 i n). The interpretation in multiagent models is straightforward, with R i interpreting^i and s i interpreting B i and 5 i . An example of an L 5 2 formula is:
This formula may be true of a system where agent 1 may communicate its beliefs to agent 2, and agent 2 has no other way of acquiring new beliefs. In details: if it is the case that, right now, agent 1 knows at most p, i.e. it knows either only p or nothing at all, and agent 2 knows at most q, then agent 1 can perform an action (a communication action) such that after the action it holds that agent 2 at most knows p and q. In other words, after the action agent 2 might still know q, if it already knew it before the action, and might know p if it was communicated by agent 1, but since it was assumed that agent 2 has no other ways of acquiring new beliefs, it can not know anything else at this point. Further examples involving the knowledge of rules are discussed in Section 4.
Axiomatization of the multiagent case is obtained by indexing modalities and epistemic operators by agents; for example, the epistemic axioms become (E1) 4 i X ! :
Y when X Y and we can express that agent i can always make a transition by adding an axiom schema (D) oe i !^i All the preceding proofs can easily be modified to show that the corresponding results hold also for the multiagent case.
Examples of complete logics which capture knowledge of inference or communication rules
In this section, we consider multimodal logics defined by conditions on the accessibility relations, which involve epistemic states. Intuitively, in these logics, transitions between states correspond to an epistemic action performed by one of the agents. We find it useful to distinguish two kinds of epistemic actions. The first kind is an internal action by the agent, corresponding to applying an inference rule (or an internal state update rule, in general). This kind of action only affects the agent's state. The second kind of action is communicating something to other agents. This is seen as broadcast communication, and as a result not only the agent's own state, but also the states of other agents may be updated. An internal inference rule could be, for example, modus ponens. There are a number of possibilities for expressing the fact that an agent is capable of reasoning by modus ponens. For example, we can say that an agent can make a transition using MP: As above, we can also require that this is the only epistemic action agent i could perform: , and the addition condition holds. Now we need to produce a model for a consistent formula with finite epistemic states, where the semantic condition still holds. We modify the proof of Theorem 2 as follows. Take a world s which satisfies , and unravel the model M so that s is the root of the model. Now intersect the epistemic state of all agents j in s with Aware j ðÞ as before; however for states s 
PROOF. The theorem follows from Theorem 16. g
It is much harder to axiomatize knowing 'at most' a rule. To get a feeling for the reason why, consider axiomatizing knowing at most modus ponens. We want to say something like: if a formula is in the agent's state after a transition, then it has either been there before the transition, or has been added as a result of applying modus ponens to some ! , which are in the agent's state. However, there are infinitely many formulae ; expressing this would require quantification over formulae:
A partial solution-which still requires only the language with 'at least' only-is to restrict our attention to rules which have a 'subformula property', such as the rule of conjunction introduction:
The class of models satisfying 5 i^int is axiomatizable by adding to K n the following axiom schemes:
PROOF. Note that C1 corresponds specifically to knowing the rule of conjunction introduction, whereas C2-C4 in some form are necessary for any 'knowing at most' a rule and state that at most one formula is added after any transition, and the states of other agents are not changed after the transition.
Soundness is straightforward. For completeness, consider a formula consistent with the axioms. Build a general canonical model for , with potentially infinite epistemic states. The axioms C3 and C4 will force the epistemic states of agents other than i to stay unchanged along the accessibility relation R i . C2 makes sure that if R i ðs; s 0 Þ, then at most one new formula is in s 0 i compared to s i , and this formula is of the form 1^ 2 . Finally, C1 makes sure that if a formula of the form 1^ 2 is added to s 0 i , then 1 ; 2 2 s i . Using this general canonical model, we build a model for with finite epistemic states as before, intersecting each epistemic state with Aware i ðÞ. This means that the resulting model contains only finitely many non-trivial transitions for conjunction introduction, but this does not violate the 5 i^int condition. g Completeness results for 'knowing at most' other inference rules with the subformula property can be proved analogously.
In general, however, we can axiomatize 'knowing at most' a rule, even when the rule does not have the subformula property, using the 'at most' operator rather than quantification over formulae.
THEOREM 19
The class of models satisfying 5 i MP is axiomatizable by adding to K5 n the following axiom schemes:
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PROOF. For soundness, observe that B1 states that agent i's epistemic state grows by at most one formula derived by MP at each step. B2 states that if agent i believes a set of formulae X in the next state, then it either already believes all formulae in X in the current state, or it believes exactly one formula less. C3 as before says that agents other than i do not acquire new beliefs along R i , and C4 and C5 assert that all agents' epistemic states grow monotonically along R i .
For completeness, consider a general model M c as in Definition 6. We are going to transform it into a model for a consistent formula 0 which satisfies condition 5 i MP. Assume that R i ðs; s 0 Þ holds. Axioms C4 and C5 make sure that for all j 6 ¼ i, s If for some X, 5 i X 2 s, then by axiom B1, in all R i -accessible worlds the epistemic state of i can have at most one extra , and it has to be derived by MP. Note that 5 i X ! oe i ? follows from B1 if there are no formulae of the form ; ! 2 X; in this case there are no R i accessible worlds.
The world s may however contain no formula of the form 5 i X. In this case, we cannot guarantee that if a formula was added, then it was added by MP. We fix those worlds, together with the finiteness requirement for epistemic states, by epistemic filtration through Atð 0 Þ, closed under applications of MP. Now if a world s does not contain 5 i X, s i contains a special formula i ; in the accessible world s 0 , s 0 i also contains i . If there are no , ! in s i such that is the formula justifying the R i transition, we add i ! to s i . g Note that the notions of 'knowing at least' and 'knowing at most' a rule we have discussed in this section are not the only possible ones. For example, interpretations of knowing modus ponens different from the ones used in 4 i MP or 5 i MP can be proposed. In Section 5.3 we briefly discuss other versions.
Applications and examples
As mentioned in the introduction, dynamic aspects of syntactic knowledge have been studied before. Here, we apply our framework to reason about examples of properties from the literature involving reasoning and communication.
Timed reasoning logic
TRL was introduced in [6] . TRL is a family of logics parameterized by a set of agents A and a rule system (set of inference rules and associated rule application strategy) for each agent. Here, we show that we can apply our framework to reason about concepts from TRL.
Each agent i 2 A has a local state which is a finite set of formulae in some logical language (propositional, predicate, modal, etc.). Different agents may use different languages at different points in time: at time t, agent i speaks the language L Each agent has some rules to produce a new state given its current state and any new beliefs obtained by observation. Each model is equipped with a function obs, which takes a step t and an agent i as arguments and returns a finite set of formulae in the agent's language at that step (observed facts). This set is added to the agent's state at the same step (observations are instantaneous). Each agent has an associated function inf i , which maps a finite set of formulae in the language L i t to another finite set of formulae in the language L i tþ1 (an agent's computation of the next state).
DEFINITION 8
Let A be a set of agents and fL One of the versions of TRL, TRL(STEP), models agents which at each step apply all their inference rules to all their beliefs (but not to formulae derived as a result). The name of the logic reflects its similarity with step logic [13] .
The syntax of TRL(STEP) rules is as follows: ði 1 ; tÞ : 1 ; :::; ði n ; tÞ : n ði; t þ 1Þ :
Here, t is a universally quantified variable over time points, and i 1 ; . . . ; i n ; i are fixed labels corresponding to names of agents. Let R be a set of TRL(STEP) inference rules. A labelled formula ði; tÞ : is derivable from a set of labelled formulae À using R (À ' R ði; tÞ : ) if there is a sequence of labelled formulae ði 1 ; t 1 Þ : 1 ; . . . ; ði n ; t n Þ : n such that:
(1) Each formula in the sequence is either a member of À, or is obtained from the previous formulae by one of the inference rules in R; and (2) the last labelled formula in the sequence is ði; tÞ : , namely ði n ; t n Þ : n ¼ ði; tÞ : .
There are two kinds of TRL(STEP) rules. The first kind of rule involves just one agent and corresponds to this agent's internal inference rules (inf i function). These rules are called internal rules.
The second kind of rule involves several agents and corresponds to exchange of information between agents, which is modelled using the obs function. The following theorem was proved in [6] : THEOREM 20 Given a set of TRL(STEP) rules R, for any finite set of labelled formulae À and a labelled formula , À ' R iff À R , where R is the set of models conforming to R and R is the consequence relation restricted to the models in R.
There is a straightforward correspondence between a TRL model (conforming to a set of rules) and a model in M ds (satisfying a corresponding set of addition conditions). Indeed, a TRL model can be represented as consisting of a sequence of states m 0 ; m 1 ; . . . ; m t ; . . . where the set of epistemic states associated with each m t is ðm 1 t ; . . . ; m n t Þ. Each pair m tÀ1 ; m t is connected by a successor relation R ¼ R 1 ¼ . . . ¼ R n which is deterministic and serial. Note that this class of models can be axiomatized by adding to KDF n a set of axiom schemeŝ i $^j for every pair i; j 2 A. Then for convenience we can use an unindexed modality defined aŝ 
THEOREM 21
Any class of TRL models conforming to a set of TRL(STEP) rules R can be axiomatized by adding to KDF n the set of axiom schemes (A ij )^i $^j and, for each rule r 2 R of the form ði; tÞ : 1 ; . . . ; ði; tÞ : n ðj; t þ 1Þ :
PROOF. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 16, but in the completeness proof the general canonical model has deterministic serial accessibility relations R i with the additional property that R i ¼ R j for all i, j. g
Dynamic epistemic logic
The logic we have presented can be seen as a generalization of DEL [10] . Duc [10] defines the logical language L DE by extending the standard epistemic language with one modal operator hF i i for each agent i. The intended interpretation of the formula hF i i is that is true after agent i has performed some train of thought (some sequence of reasoning steps). While the name given to the logic may suggest otherwise, DEL seems to be closer related to temporal logic than to dynamic logic [20] : the intended interpretation of the hF i i operator is like the interpretation of the 'future' operator from temporal logic, and the logical language allows no composition of actions inside the modal operators-there is only one modal operator hF i i for each agent and no PDL-like composite operators such as hF i Ãi or
Formally, L DE is defined over a number of agents n and a set of primitive propositions È as follows. L E is the standard epistemic language over n and È (Duc uses K i instead of our B i for belief/knowledge). L E and L DE are the least sets such that:
The operator ½F i is defined as a dual to hF i i in the usual way: ½F i :½F i :. DEL is presented via a logical system DES4 n over the language L DE , intended to be a 'dynamic' version of S4 n . In the definition of the system, a sublanguage L þ E L E of persistent formulae is used. L þ E contains all the formulae of L E without any occurrences of the knowledge operators K i (called objective formulae) and is closed under the following conditions:
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ð ! ð ! ÞÞ ! ðð ! Þ ! ð ! ÞÞ PC3:
ð: ! :Þ ! ð ! Þ TL1:
hF i iK i ðð: ! :Þ ! ð ! ÞÞ DE7:
and the following inference rules:
R1:
PC1-PC3 and R1 axiomatize propositional logic, TL1-TL2 and R2 the temporal operator hF i i and DE1-DE8 the epistemic operator K i and the interaction between the temporal and epistemic operators.
Duc does not define a formal semantics for DEL. 3 The main motivation behind DEL is to describe agents who are non-omniscient but nevertheless rational and non-ignorant. Examples of DES4 n theorems intended to illustrate this are:
We now show that we can successfully apply our framework to the mentioned open problem of DEL: to provide a semantics for which the logic is sound and complete. Our logic can be seen as a generalization of DEL along two dimensions: the temporal and the epistemic.
In the temporal dimension, the two logics have the same set of modalities, written^i in our logic and hF i i in DEL for each agent i. In our basic system,^i has the temporal interpretation 'some next state', while as mentioned above the intended interpretation of hF i i is 'some future state'. As we have seen in Section 2.5, we can easily extend our basic system to give the latter interpretation of^i : by using transitive frames and extending the logical systems with the 4 axiom.
In the epistemic dimension, while the agents described by DEL are not logically omniscient in the sense that there are no conditions on what an agent must know, there are nevertheless quite strong assumptions about the agents' reasoning mechanisms. Particularly, an agent:
Can reason perfectly in propositional logic (DE4-DE6, R1) Can never get to know anything false or inconsistent (and knows this) (DE2, DE7) Always reasons monotonically. Only persistent formulae are included in this definition of monotone reasoning, however. Particularly, temporal indexicals (e.g. K i hF i i) and negative epistemicals (e.g. :K i ) are not persistent. Monotonicity is a quite strong assumption, and is incompatible with e.g. belief revision or 'forgetting'. Can do positive introspection (DE8)
Our logic is a general framework which does not make any of these assumptions. The assumptions do, however, define a special class of our models.
In the remainder of this section, we provide a complete and sound semantics for Duc's logic, based on the models in M satisfying additional conditions. We can work in the language L (Section 2.1), as we do not need the 5 operator. We can view L DE formulae as L formulae by:
(1) Taking the object language OL ¼ L E : (2) Making the following very minor modification of L, due to the fact that we for reasons of simplicity up until now have not included primitive propositions directly as well formed formulae (as defined in Section 2.1, while Bp is a well formed formula, p is not). Add the primitive DEL propositions È as primitive propositions in L, and change the definition of V in the models as follows to interpret also È: V : WÀ!} fin ðÂ [ ÈÞ (still with the proviso that for every world w and agent i the set fB i : B i 2 VðwÞg is finite (otherwise it is a general model), and we still keep the notation of VðwÞ for the set f : B i 2 VðwÞg). The truth definition for È is standard: M; w p , p 2 VðwÞ. In what follows, we write K i for B i and hF i i for^i, to be consistent with Duc's notation.
Let Ax i be the set of formulae DE4-DE7 prescribe that agent i must know in some accessible state: DSEL [3] is, as mentioned in the introduction, a logic describing how finite syntactic epistemic states can evolve in a branching-time future, and how coalitions of agents can cooperate strategically to reach certain epistemic states, based on ATL. In Section 4, we studied how to express reasoning rules, such as modus ponens, in our framework, by using the operators 4; 5;^, etc. One of the distinguishing features of DSEL is that it has syntactic objects standing for rules, allowing referring to rules directly in the logical language. The logical language has operators similar to 4 and 5 which take sets of rules, rather than sets of formulae, as arguments, in order to express properties of reasoning similar to 4 i MP and 5 i MP from Section 4. However, the exact notions of knowing at least and knowing at most a set of rules are different from the ones we discussed in Section 4-exactly how will be clear momentarily-and we shall in this section apply our framework to characterise these notions. There is no complete axiomatization of DSEL, and we saw in Section 4 that complete axiomatization of concepts related to 'knowing at most' a rule is difficult, so we limit the discussion here to defining the corresponding model classes with our language rather than investigating completeness. In order to avoid too many technical details, we do not present the formal syntax of DSEL rules here. It suffices here to know that there exist a set RUL of rules (these are syntactic objects that can be parts of formulae, rather than semantic objects), and an interpretation function ½½Á interpreting each set of rules R RUL as a relation over finite sets of object language formulae:
Intuitively, when ðX; YÞ 2 ½½R, X and Y are a sets of formulae corresponding to the antecedent and consequent, respectively, of some rule in R. An important difference between DSEL rules and the type of rules we discussed in Section 4 is that the former describe complete epistemic states-they say that the rule (or set of rules) R can take you from knowing exactly the formulae in a set X to knowing exactly the formulae in a set Y (ðX; YÞ 2 ½½R), while the latter describe what we called addition constraints.
The following are the DSEL variants of knowing at least/at most a (set of) rule(s) R (the semantic framework of DSEL is different from ours, so the following are reasonable re-interpretations of the DSEL concepts in our semantics). We say that an agent who knows exactly formulae X knows at least rules R for reasoning (in the DSEL sense) if he can access a world where he knows exactly C for each ðX; CÞ 2 ½½R. Dually, he knows at most R for reasoning if for every world he can access where he knows exactly C, ðX; CÞ 2 ½½R. Formally, let M ¼ ðW; R 1 ; . . . ; R n ; VÞ be a model and R a set of rules. In a state It follows that the models of fðRÞ (gðRÞ) are exactly the models where ATLEAST-R (ATMOST-R) holds in every state.
Communication
In DSEL, reasoning is seen as a generalization of communication: reasoning is 'communication to oneself'. Thus, rules can be used to reason about both concepts.
However, there is a difference in the intuitive interpretation of knowing a reasoning rule and knowing a communication rule. In the former case, formalized earlier, the consequent of the rule is assumed to describe the complete next epistemic state of the agent. In the latter, the consequent should only be interpreted as a part of the next epistemic state of the agent. Formally, we can describe the fact that i knows a set of rules R for communication to j in state w of model M ¼ ðW; R 1 ; . . . ; R n ; VÞ as follows: 
Related work
In the introduction we discussed some classes of logics which use the syntactic approach. In the previous section, we established certain relationships between our framework and three other logics describing the dynamics of syntactically ascribed knowledge. It was shown that we can completely axiomatize an interesting timed reasoning logic [6] which was in turn inspired by step logics [13] . We also saw that our framework can also be seen as a generalization of DEL [10] . When it comes to DSEL [1] , in Section 5 we only applied our framework to express knowledge of reasoning and communication rules. DSEL does, however, also have temporal operators from ATL which cannot be expressed in our framework, so we cannot completely describe DSEL. Aside from that, there are other interesting differences in the semantic assumptions of DSEL as well. In particular, in DSEL it is assumed that the next state of the system is a function of choices/actions made by all agents simultaneously, while we assume that the next state is a function of a choice/action made by a single agent. Another related strand of work which we did not analyse earlier is the work by Sierra et al. [30] on architectures of multiunit knowledge bases. Their work has different motivations, but quite similar outcome to our approach to epistemic logic.
Sierra et al. propose to use a version of dynamic logic, which they call Descriptive Dynamic Logic (DDL), to describe a system of communicating 'units', each with a different initial logical language and theory and its own internal inference rules; in addition there are 'bridge rules' which allow units to exchange information.
In each state, units are assigned finite sets of formulae in their languages; we would call those formulae beliefs, Sierra et al. call them theories of the units. A significant restriction made in [30] is that not just the theories of units, but also the sets of all possible formulae in the units' languages are finite.
Internal actions of units in DDL correspond to 'deduction steps' in the internal logic of the unit, that is, all possible instances of applications of inference rules (denoted as ½À ' kk , where k is the name of the unit, À [ fg is a set of formulae in k's language, and k has an inference rule by which À derives ). Inter-unit actions correspond to bridge rules, so that if there is a bridge rule by which À in the theory of k implies in the theory of l, then this instance of its application corresponds to an operator ½À ' kl .
DDL is given a complete axiomatization parametrized by unit's languages and inference rules. This results relies on having the unit's languages finite and cannot be used to axiomatize the logics considered in this article, as far as we can see.
The work on logics of awareness [14, 15] and unawareness [19] can arguably also be classified as a syntactic approach to belief, since a syntactic awareness filter is superimposed on the agent's beliefs which are defined using the possible worlds approach. However, the main difference between our approach and the logics of awareness is that the latter abstract from dynamics of beliefs and do not model the evolution of the awareness set as a result of the agent's inference or computation. The same applies to logics of algorithmic knowledge [18, 16, 29] , where the agent's beliefs are modelled as closed under the agent's ability to compute consequences (which is elegantly modelled in [29] as a set of rewrite rules).
Conclusions
We combined the syntactic approach to epistemic logic with modal logics in order to model transitions between states of knowledge. The two epistemic operators i and 5, were used to express (finite) lower and upper bounds on knowledge, respectively. We were mostly interested in models where agents are restricted to only knowing finitely many formulae at each point in time. We studied axiomatization and complexity of the resulting logics. In particular, and perhaps most interesting from a logical point of view, we demonstrated techniques for dealing with the finiteness assumption and the 5 operator, separately and combined.
We have thus shown how a modal epistemic logic may be used to formalise rational, but non-omniscient agents. This problem is a challenge to the standard epistemic modal logics, where knowledge is closed under logical consequence. This makes these logics unsuitable for specifying and verifying properties of non-omniscient agents, which may be able to reliably apply a set of inference rules. We have investigated the formal properties of such logics, and shown how to axiomatize several interesting classes of transition systems in them. One of the classes provides a semantics for the logic introduced in [10] . We are optimistic that this type of logics can be used to formulate properties of agents in standard verification tasks, and plan to investigate their use in model-checking resource-bounded reasoners in further work.
